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Abstract 
Against the background of the widespread adoption of "structural adjustment" 
programmes in Africa, and intense continuing controversies about their appro- 
priateness, the chief purpose of this paper is to explore the relationships between 
adjustment and long-run development. It examines the patterns of structural 
change and adaptation that occur during development; the forces which necessi- 
tate such changes; and the processes of adaptation. 
The argument is developed that the present-day preoccupation with 
"structural adjustment" should be seen in the context of a continuous process of 
economic adaptation to changing circumstances and opportunities. Flexible 
economies thus have an advantage in the pursuit of development; rigid struc- 
tures and policies are an obstacle to it. It is suggested, moreover, that some kinds 
of structural change are "enabling" in character. 
The basic model is one of stimulus-and-response, with structures adapting to 
trends in the compositions of demand and trade, and to various "shocks". It is 
suggested that the prime determinants of the flexibility of an economy are to be 
found in the efficiency of its informational and incentive systems, and its re- 
sponsiveness to these. Suggestions are made for research, and the paper con- 
cludes by considering its implications for future AERC-assisted research. 
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I. Introduction' 
The purposes and arguments of the paper 
Discussion of economic policy in Africa in the 1980s has been dominated by the 
notion of "structural adjustment". The acute payments and other difficulties ex- 
perienced by most African economies have required many of them to turn to the 
IMF and World Bank for financial assistance, and the policy conditionality of 
the Bretton Woods institutions has been the chief vehicle for the widespread 
adoption of structural adjustment programmes. Typically, these have involved 
substantial changes of policy and have given the Fund and Bank an unprece- 
dented degree of influence over economic policies in Africa (although it is easy 
to exaggerate their power to bring about major changes). 
But while structural adjustment has taken on so much importance, it has re- 
mained loosely defined as a concept and is often poorly understood. There is, in 
particular, a lack of clarity about how it relates to long-term economic develop- 
ment. A common view would see adjustment as the economics of transition, and 
at least some of the major shareholders of the Bretton Woods institutions appar- 
ently see it as a temporary phase, a prelude to a resumption of more traditional 
types of lending by both institutions.2 Others see the policies associated with ad- 
justment programmes as inimical to long-run development. The purposes of this 
paper are to explore the relationships between adjustment and long-run devel- 
opment, to provide some guidance on the relevant literature and to consider 
what implications these might have for future research within the Consortium. 
In what follows we will explore the patterns of structural change and adaptation 
that occur during development; the forces which necessitate such changes; and 
the processes of adaptation. We explore the nature of an adaptive economy and 
conclude by briefly relating the views developed in the paper to "structural ad- 
justment" as it is commonly understood. The paper is therefore primarily about 
the ways economies change over time, rather than about the specifics of adjust- 
ment policies, which largely fall outside its terms of reference. 
Very briefly, the argument developed here is that the present-day stress on ad- 
justrnent should be seen in the context of a continuous process of economic 
adaptation to changing circumstances and opportunities. Major structural shifts 
are intrinsic to development and flexible economies are likely to develop more 
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some kinds of structural change are "enabling" in character, promoting more 
rapid progress elsewhere in the economy. 
The basic model is one of stimulus-and-response. Observed patterns of 
change are related to long-run and cyclical trends, particularly in the composi- 
tion of final demand and international trade, and also as responses to short-term 
"shocks" of a type that has been familiar in the l980s. What determines the flex- 
ibility of an economy is as yet not well understood. Analytically, it is suggested 
that the answer is to be found in terms of the efficiency of its informational and 
incentive systems, and its responsiveness to these. This responsiveness is, in 
turn, broken down into receptivity to change and elasticities, chiefly supply 
elasticities. Adjustment is defined as induced adaptation and adjustment policies 
as the instruments deployed by governments to bring this about. It is suggested 
that the structural adjustment policies associated with the Bretton Woods insti- 
tutions are narrower in their coverage and shorter in their time horizons. They 
do, however, address crucially important aspects of the tasks of economic adap- 
tation in the late 1 980s, particularly as it relates to the foreign-exchange con- 
straint, although there remain points of tension with aspects of long-term adap- 
tation. Suggestions are made for research and the paper concludes by consider- 
ing the implications for future Consortium-assisted research. 
The meaning of "structure" 
Given its central importance for this paper, we ought perhaps to clarify the idea 
of structure. The three alternative ways of computing the national accounts pro- 
vide an entry point. Thus, we can think of the structure of production, repre- 
sented by industrial origin accounts, which is probably the most common 
meaning given to the concept of the structure of an economy. In addition to the 
obvious sectors of agriculture and industry, we might mention the financial sys- 
tem as a sector of large importance in an economy's structure. When focusing 
on the balance of payments, it can also be useful to re-classify the productive 
sectors into those producing tradeable and non-tradeable goods and services. 
Next, we can think of the factoral composition of value added, the availability at 
a given time of labour, enterprise, capital and natural resources. The ways in 
which value added is distributed among them give rise to the functional distri- 
bution of income, which feeds into the size distribution of income, and can also 
be regarded as an aspect of an economy's structure. Last, we can think of the 
composition of the sources and uses of resources as a dimension of structure, 
particularly the breakdown of resource uses as between consumption and in- 
vestment. 
National accounting aggregates give only part of the picture, however. There 
is a more elusive—but very important—aspect of an economy's structure which 
can be loosely caiied its institutional base. Included in this is the political sys- 
tem, the legal framework and the agencies for its enforcement, established pat- 
terns of social organization and control (including the existence and freedoms of 
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special-interest organizations like trade unions), the agencies of public adminis- 
tration, and the physical infrastructure, providing transport and communications. 
Demographic variables can be counted in too, including the age and dependency 
characteristics of the population, and the degree of urbanization. 
In short, when we talk of an economy's structure we are referring to aspects 
which are in some sense basic and long-lasting and underpin more transitory 
aspects of economic life. By implication, structural variables are mostly deep- 
seated and normally change only rather gradually. 
II. Patterns of change 
It is well established, both historically and through cross-country studies, that 
there are a number of long-term regularities in the way an economy's structure 
changes as per capita income rises.3 These provide our starting point, and our 
first task is to briefly review some of the chief regularities that have been estab- 
lished. 
The structure of production and trade 
Table 1 illustrates a number of well-established generalizations about structural 
change. Some of the chief regularities that have been observed are that: 
(a) The share of agriculture in both total output and employment diminishes 
continuously as per capita incomes rise; 
(b) The share of industry (mainly mining and manufacturing) in output and 
employment rises and, within that, the share of manufacturing rises relative 
to mining; 
(c) Manufacturing tends to start with relatively simple consumer goods, such 
as processed foods and clothing, gradually shifts to the production of heavy 
capital goods, proceeding finally to microelectronics and other high-tech 
products; 
(d) There is also a trend for the service industries to grow in importance rela- 
tive to GDP and total employment; 
(e) Large trade dependence—high ratios of imports and exports to GDP—also 
tends to diminish with increase in per capita income.This is a result of the 
enlargement of the national economy as development proceeds, rather than 
being intrinsic to development per se, for there is a strong negative correla- 
tion between economy size and openness. Since a high proportion of LDCs 
(and almost all African countries) have small economies they therefore 
tend also to be heavily dependent on trade;4 
1. Gross national saving 
as percent of GNP 7.8 11.0 14.1 17.1 19.9 
2. Gross domestic investment 
as percent of GDP 12.7 14.8 17.1 19.4 21.8 
3. Capital inflow as percent 
of GDP 4.9 3.8 3.0 2.4 2.0 
4. Government revenue as 
percent of GDP 12.2 14.2 17.0 20.6 25.1 
5. Primary and secondary 
enrollment ratio 17.5 36.2 52.6 66.9 78.9 
6. Adult literacy ratio 15.3 36.5 55.2 71.5 85.4 
7. Food consumption as percent 
of total consumption 61.9 56.1 49.9 43.0 35.9 
8. Gross product of primary 
sector as percent of GDP 58.1 46.4 36.0 26.7 18.6 
9. Gross product of industry 
sectoraspercentofGDP 7.3 13.5 19.6 25.5 31.4 
10. Gross product of service 
sectoraspercentofGDP 29.9 34.6 37.9 39.9 40.5 
11. ExportsaspercentofGoP 16.5 17.1 18.2 19.7 21.6 
12. Industry exports as percent 
of GDP 0.0 0.8 3.7 6.9 10.5 
13. Birth rate 46.6 41.8 36.6 31.1 25.3 
14. Death rate 20.5 15.2 11.4 9.3 8.9 
15. Urban population as percent 
of total population 6.9 20.0 33.8 45.5 55.3 
16. Primary employment as 
percent of total employment 84.2 74.0 57.4 43.9 29.0 
17. Industry employment as 
percent of total employment 6.5 9.9 15.3 23.4 31.1 
18. Service employment as p 
ercent of total employment 19.5 21.8 27.3 32.7 40.0 
Notes: See text for method of estimation. 
(a) "Neither" indicates neither "early" nor 'late". 
Source: Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976, p. 288, based on Chenery, H.B., H. 
Elkington, and C. Sims, 1970, "A Uniform Analysis of Development 
Patterns," Economic Development Report No. 148 (July), Project for 
Quantative Research in Economic Development. Cambridge: 
Harvard Center for International Affairs, Table G, pp. 42-43. 
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(f) Parallel with the changes in productive structure, the share of primary 
products in total exports diminishes as development proceeds. This is per- 
haps implicit in the figures in lines 11 and 12 of the table, but is more di- 
rectly illustrated by World Bank statistics for 1986 which show that pri- 
mary commodities make up 68 per cent of the exports of low-income 
countries, 41 per cent of upper-middle-income countries and only 20 per 
cent for industrial market economies.5 This feature of international trade in 
turn affects the rate of transformation of the domestic economy, for the 
decline of primary production in GDP is slower in countries whose com- 
modity exports are large relative to total production; 
(g) Also implicit and closely related is a tendency for "informal sector" activi- 
ties to decline relative to those in the formal or organized parts of the econ- 
omy. 
As they develop, economies become more complex and the extent of inter- 
linkages between the various sectors of production increases. This increased 
extent of inter-industry linkages helps to explain a further feature of the devel- 
opment of the productive structure: a proportionately increased use of interme- 
diate goods within the system. Indeed, increased demand by producers for in- 
termediates has been found statistically to be an important reason for the relative 
growth of the industrial and some service sectors. 
Two qualifications are necessary here. First, although there is some tendency 
for manufacturing to go through the phases mentioned in (c) above, the tendency 
is quite weak statistically because of the influence of exports and import-substi- 
tution. The pattern of manufacturing within any one country will be strongly 
affected by the comparative advantage which that country may have established 
on world markets, and by domestic policies relating to protection and import- 
substitution. 
Second, there is in the late twentieth century some weakening of the tendency 
for the share of manufacturing to rise as incomes go up. A recent study by the 
World Bank suggests, in fact, an inverted-U relationship, with the share of 
manufacturing first rising then, after a per capita income of around $8,000, 
falling. This is illustrated in Figure 1. This study goes on to point out, however, 
that this result may at least in part be due to the classification as "services" of a 
variety of activities associated with manufacturing which were formerly 
undertaken within manufacturing companies but are now contracted out to more 
specialized enterprises. In any case, for the low-income countries of Africa, 
Figure 1 reinforces the strong presumption that manufacturing will be of 
increasing importance as the economy develops. 
What is implicit in these observed regularities is that growth is associated 
with a diversification of production. An increasingly wide range of manufac- 
tured products and services will augment a productive structure previously dom- 
inated by agriculture and, in some cases, mining. Specialization will increase, in 
production and in distribution, as demands within the economy become more 
diverse. The same trends will also be observed within sectors. In agriculture, for 
example, output will become less dominated by the production of starchy foods 
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and other basics, and resources will be shifted into the production of meat, horti- 
cultural and other "luxury" foods, particularly to meet the needs of the towns as 
urbanization proceeds. Also within the rural economy, off-farm activities of 
various kinds will become increasingly important as sources of income and em- 
ployment, relative to income derived directly from farming. 
Fig. 1 Relationship between GDP per capita and the share of manufacturing 
value added in GDP in selected economies, 1984 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, p.51. 
Share of manufacturing value added in GOP (percent) 
• Developing economy 
o Industrial ecarlomy 
6 8 0 
GDP per copita(thousonds of dollars) 
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Another approach to the analysis of changes in the structure of production 
during development is to classify output into tradeable and non-tradeable goods 
and services. Although there are other ways of defining them, we take trade- 
ables to consist of all goods that do or can enter into trade as exports or imports; 
the domestic production of such goods therefore covers both exports and import 
substitutes. Non-tradeables consist of everything else. As a very rough approxi- 
mation, tradeables can be thought of as largely made up of the total output of 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing, plus certain service industries such as 
tourism and shipping. Note that on this view it is not necessary for a tradeable to 
actually be traded, merely that it is capable of being exported or imported. The 
most important non-tradeables are various government and other services, such 
as health, education, defence and domestic service. 
This is a distinction of some importance for our purposes. Balance of pay- 
ments difficulties are the largest single reason for the adoption of adjustment 
policies in developing countries. Such adjustments require the relative transfer 
of resources out of non-tradeables into tradeables—to boost exports and reduce 
import requirements. The ability to do so with reasonable speed is therefore an 
important attribute. At the same time, there is some evidence that the importance 
of tradeables in total output tends to diminish as development proceeds, chiefly 
as a result of the relative rise in services already noted.6 
Transportability is the key quality that separates tradeables from non-trade- 
ables. The latter are either not transportable by their intrinsic nature, or the cost 
of transporting them is so prohibitively high as to effectively preclude them 
from being traded between countries. Like many other distinctions, this one 
tends to break down on close examination, however. It is actually quite hard to 
think of a good or service which is not tradeable at all. Thus, defence can be 
traded, as is illustrated by the use of mercenaries from other countries. Electric 
power is already traded between a number of adjoining countries. Education is 
traded, as evidenced by the large number of fee-paying students from develop- 
ing countries studying in Western universities. And so on. Moreover, there are 
so many inter-sectoral linkages in a modem economy that the output of agricul- 
ture and industry will depend crucially on inputs from "non-traded" sectors, thus 
further weakening the distinction. It is probably best to think of tradeability as a 
quality possessed by almost all outputs but in varying degrees. So when we talk 
of shifting resources from non-tradeables to tradeables this should be interpreted 
as shifting from outputs which do not enter much into trade to those which make 
up the bulk of exports and imports. 
In addition to those summarized above, generalizations can be made concern- 
ing relationships between financial development and the "real" sectors of the 
economy, based on work by Goldsmith (1969, 1983, 1985). His researches have 
established another inverted-U relationship: that at the earlier stages of devel- 
opment the financial system grows substantially faster than both GDP and 
wealth before levelling off or declining beyond some level of per capita income. 
He uses a "financial interrelations ratio" as a measure of this, defined as the ratio 
of the value of all financial instruments to the total value of wealth in the econ- 
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omy, and the following ratios illustrate the general pattern that he observes:7 
India Japan USA 
1876—1913 0.15 1886—1913 0.62 1881—1912 0.77 
1914—1939 0.24 1914—1940 1.41 1913—1939 1.11 
1951—1975 0.39 1956—1975 0.93 1940—1955 1.18 
1956—1975 0.92 
All three countries revealed rising ratios in the earlier periods. This trend per- 
sisted throughout in the case of India, a country with low per capita incomes, 
whereas the ratio declined in both Japan and the USA in the later years, when 
most modernization had already been achieved. During the earlier stages, the 
value of agricultural land and livestock diminishes relative to the total value of 
all assets, while bank deposits, holdings of government-issued debt and other fi- 
nancial claims increase their share. This process of "financial deepening" starts 
with the commercial banks and the monetization of economic activity. After a 
time, however, more specialized financial institutions—insurance companies, 
building societies, pension funds, savings banks, stock markets and supporting 
services—become of increasing importance and the financial sector thus experi- 
ences the diversification of output experienced in other parts of the productive 
structure. 
Other changes 
In addition to the transformation of the productive structure, other structural 
changes also occur which are relevant to our purposes. First, and unsurprisingly, 
the ratio of domestic saving to GDP tends to rise with per capita income. This 
has a depressing effect on investment levels in low-income countries, but they 
are generally able to augment their own saving by attracting finance from the 
rest of the world, and are thus able to sustain higher investment levels than 
would be permitted by their own saving. As incomes grow the savings ratio 
rises, the gap between saving and investment narrows and—in the general 
case—is finally reversed, so that the country ultimately becomes a net exporter 
of capital.8 Lines 1 to 3 of Table 1 show this trend at work, although it does not 
go far enough up the income scale to demonstrate the capital-exporting phase. 
A related consequence of the increasing complexity and specialization which 
marks the modem economy is the separation of the functions of saving and in- 
vesting. In an economy dominated by small-scale agriculture, petty trade and 
other "informal" enterprises, a large share of investment is undertaken directly 
by those who save for this purpose. As the demands of production grow more 
complex and require more capital, and as the saving capacities of households 
grow with income, so there is an increasing need for banks and similar institu- 
tions to mediate between savers and investors. Hence the financial deepening 
and the increasing diversity of financial institutions mentioned earlier. 
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Another related structural feature is the tendency for the availability of capital 
to rise relative to labour during the process of development. This is true both of 
inanimate capital—buildings, machines, the transport network, etc.—and of 
"human capital", or the income-earning skills of the labour force. These capital: 
labour ratios are difficult to measure directly, but one rough-and-ready proxy 
that is sometimes used for the employment of inanimate capital is energy use 
(although there is a large consumption element in that too). This is illustrated by 
the following statistics (expressed in kilograms of oil equivalent), which show 
industrial countries using nearly 60 times as much energy per capita as low-in- 
come countries:9 
Low-income economies 86 
Lower-middle-income economies 346 
Upper-middle-income economies 1,527 
Industrial market economies 4,952 
So far as human capital is concerned, the statistics in lines 5 and 6 of Table 1 
give some proxy indicators of the spread of education and modern skills. 
Although these are only imperfect indicators, they do convey something of the 
rapid spread of modem knowledge during the course of development. Another 
feature that may be observed from the table (line 15) is the progressive urban- 
ization of the population, associated with the industrialization noted earlier. 
Mention should finally be made of changes in the size distribution of income, 
although the empirical basis for generalization about this is quite weak.10 The 
starting point is Kuznets' suggestion that there is an inverted-U relationship 
between per capita income and income inequality, as conventionally measured 
by the Gini coefficient: as poor countries begin to raise average incomes, 
inequality first tends to rise but, after some critical level of per capita income, 
begins to go down again. A number of econometric studies have found some 
support for this hypothesis, although others have not. None finds very strong 
support, partly, no doubt, because of poor data but also, presumably, because 
many other factors besides stage of development will influence the size of the 
Gini, not least the socio-political system and the policies pursued on this matter. 
Research issues 
The patterns of structural change described above are merely generalizations 
based on broad historical and cross-country studies. They do not chart any inex- 
orable laws to which all economies must conform, not the least because past 
history necessarily impinges upon future possibilities. Moreover, Africa has 
been under-represented in such studies because of data shortages. An approach 
to African country-specific research in this area, therefore, would be to treat the 
various generalizations as hypotheses against which to test patterns of structural 
change in African economies. Do African experiences conform to the general 
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pattern and if not, why not? One complication is that in recent decades there has 
been little rise in per capita incomes and in some there has been an actual de- 
cline. This feature throws up the further question, is the generalized pattern of 
change reversible—do structures revert to those associated with earlier stages of 
development as incomes decline? 
A few more specific researchable topics suggest themselves: 
• As regards manufacturing, do African countries represent a case of 
"premature industrialization", undergoing patterns of industrial change that 
have in the past been associated with greater advances in other aspects of 
the economic structure? Has the pattern of change within manufacturing 
conformed to the patterns elsewhere? If not, why not? 
• To what extent do changes in the composition of exports and imports con- 
form to the general case? Has there occurred a diversification of exports 
and a shift away from dependence on primary products? Svedberg's 1988 
results suggest there has been little progress on this front. If so, does coun- 
try evidence agree with his explanations of this? 
• To what extent has the financial deepening and diversification suggested 
by Goldsmith's work been occurring and what have been the chief policy 
and non-policy influences on this? Does the concept of "financial repres- 
sion" (McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw, 1973) help to explain the record? 
• How is the distinction between tradeables and non-tradeables to be under- 
stood and measured in a country-specific context? What has been happen- 
ing to the mix of production as between these two and how mobile are re- 
sources between them? 
III. Imperatives for adaptation 
While economics does not possess an adequate theory to explain the patterns of 
structural change described in Part II, a basic premise of this paper is that, in 
varying degrees, economies are responsive to stimuli—negative or positive— 
and, therefore, that these patterns are to be understood as adaptations to changes 
in the economic environment. In short, they are "structural adjustments". But to 
what stimuli might the regularities described above be responses? 
Explaining long-run change 
(a) Consumers' sovereignly 
Although the concept of consumers' sovereignty is nowadays old fashioned, the 
idea that ultimately it is consumers' preferences which determine what shall be 
produced is a valuable one for present purposes because there are observed regu- 
larities in the patterns of demand which broadly match the shifts in the product 
mix.11 The best-known such regularity is expressed in Engel's law. This states 
that the proportion of income spent on food diminishes as income increases, and 
is one of the most robust of empirical generalizations about economic life. It is 
reflected in line 7 of Table 1 which shows the share of food in total consumption 
diminishing steadily as per capita income rises, and this helps to explain the 
long-run tendency for the share of agriculture to diminish in total output. 
It is, however, possible to go beyond Engel's law to offer a rather richer set of 
generalizations about consumption patterns. Various cross-country studies of 
consumption patterns reveal a remarkable universality, apparently valid across 
enormously varied economic and cultural differences.12 Table 2 sets out un- 
weighted means of income elasticities of demand13 for various categories of 
consumption calculated from estimates for 30 countries on 1975 data. The 
countries varied from the very poor (India) to the very rich (USA), and the use 
of unweighted means can be justified by the very limited dispersion of the 
country results around the means. 
It will be seen from this that: 
(a) Engel's law is confirmed, with an income elasticity for food of well below 
one. With a mean elasticity of 0.46, a 10 percent rise in income will induce 
less than a 5 percent rise in food expenditures. 
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Table 2 Mean income elasticities of demand for 30 countries, selected 
commodity groups, in 1975 






Food 0.70 0.20 0.46 
Beverages and tobacco 1.02 1 .02 1.02 
Clothing and footwear 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Gross rent and fuel 1.43 1.23 1.29 
House furnishings and operations 1.64 1.27 1.38 
Medical care 1.70 1.28 1.40 
Transport and communications 1.59 1.27 1.36 
Recreation 1.80 1.30 1.44 
Notes: (a) India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Thailand. 
(b) Germany, France, Denmark, Luxembourg and USA. 
Source: Finke, Rosaisky and Theil, 1983, Table 1. 
(b) The income elasticities for beverages and tobacco, clothing and footwear 
are around unity, i.e. demand grows at about the same pace as income. 
(c) Housing (represented by "gross rent and fuel"), household furnishings, 
medical care, transport and communications, and recreation all have in- 
come elasticities well above unity. Significantly, most of these items relate 
to the products of various service industries and this can be related to the 
long-run tendency for the share of the services sector in GDP to grow. 
Unfortunately, the system of classification used does not bring out the gen- 
eral tendency for income elasticities for manufactured goods, taken to- 
gether, to also have relatively large income elasticities. 
(d) Although the above generalizations are valid for the complete sample of 
countries, poor and rich, there are also some important differences between 
them. The income elasticity for food is much lower in wealthy countries 
than poor countries. The same tendency is true, in varying degrees, of 
housing, furniture, transport and communications, recreation and medical 
care. By implication, the income elasticity of saving is higher in the more 
wealthy economies, consistent with the figures in Table 1 (line 1). 
(b) Trade and other influences 
Notwithstanding these regularities in demand patterns and their conformity to 
the shifts in the pattern of production noted earlier, statistically speaking they 
provide only a partial explanation of the relative rise of manufacturing and ser- 
vices and the fall of the primary sectors. Patterns of comparative advantage and 
trade policies also provide powerful stimuli for structural change, for trade frees 
domestic producers of tradeables from the confines of the domestic market, and 
the ability to import means that much demand is satisfied by production abroad. 
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The influence of trade is particularly large because world trade has had a long- 
term tendency to grow faster than world output, as is shown by the following 
ratios of the growth of world trade relative to the growth of world GDP: 
1960—1970 1.56 1980—1987 1.03 
1970—1979 1.51 1960—1987 1.40 
But while trade and the opportunities for specialization within it do loosen the 
ties between demand patterns and domestic production, in the end the demand 
patterns reassert themselves through their influence on world prices and the 
profitability of different categories of trade. Note the large differences in the 
rates of growth of world export volumes by commodity group set out in Table 3. 
Although these are the joint outcome of technical, price and income changes, 
they do nonetheless conform to what would be expected on the basis of long- 
term trends in demand patterns. World trade in agricultural products is shown as 
expanding much less rapidly, and trade in metals and manufactures much more 
rapidly, than total trade. Unfortunately, data on trade in services are less good 
and many services are essentially non-tradeable, but it is certainly the case that 
trade in services has become an important part of total commerce between na- 
tions. According to one estimate, world receipts in respect of service transac- 
tions in 1986 amounted to nearly $1,000 billion, equivalent to about half the 
value of merchandise trade. 14 
Table 3 Growth of world export volumes by commodity group (% pa.) 
1965—1 987 
Commodity group 1965—1973 1973—1980 1980—1987 






































Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, Table A8. 
Engel's law and a similar tendency for other primary products to display 
small—and probably declining—income elasticities of world demand is, of 
course, a grave problem for the countries of Africa, who are heavily dependent 
on primary product exports, for they are selling on markets with generally small 
income elasticities of demand.15 Weak markets are a consequence and in recent 
years the view that there is a long-run tendency for the relative price of primary 
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products to decline, originally associated with the names of Prebisch and Singer, 
has become more widely accepted. Although the position varies greatly from 
commodity to commodity, a recent study concluded that during the twentieth 
century real non-oil commodity prices, taken together, have declined at a trend 
rate of 0.6 percent p.a.16 It is healthier to specialize in items for which demand 
grows at least in line with world income. 
Technical progress provides another important stimulus to structural change, 
again chiefly through the mediation of international trade. This is most obvi- 
ously the case with high-tech industries, but even in agriculture major recent ad- 
vances in biotechnology appear likely to effect major changes in comparative 
advantages in the production of various crops and products. In relation to devel- 
oped and some developing countries, the position of some African primary pro- 
ducers is at risk from these advances because of a widening technology gap. 17 
Some complications 
Although it has been analytically convenient to set our discussion in terms of a 
stimulus-response model, in practice the variables interact with each other, mak- 
ing it considerably more difficult to disentangle cause and effect. Thus, we 
noted earlier that the changes in the productive structure summarized in Table 1, 
with their industrialization and greater diversification of output, lead to a rela- 
tive rise in the production of intermediate goods—itself a significant structural 
change. Another example is provided by the long-run tendencies for saving and 
investment to rise relative to GDP and for human and inanimate capital to in- 
crease relative to unskilled labour. This obviously has implications for the pro- 
ductive structure, facilitating the development of capital-intensive activities and 
leading to a movement of resources out of traditional lines. In turn, the growing 
availability of capital has implications for a country's pattern of international 
trade. According to the Hekscher-Ohlin thesis, a country will have comparative 
advantages in goods requiring proportionately large inputs of factors of produc- 
tion which are in abundant supply within the economy.18 With increasing rela- 
tive availabilities of human and inanimate capital we expect countries to export 
progressively more goods and services requiring capital-intensive processes, and 
this is broadly in line with the relative growth in industrial exports as develop- 
ment proceeds, shown in line 12 of Table 1. 
Similarly, while in the longer run much structural transformation is a response 
to changing demand and opportunities, it is also reasonable to believe that to 
some extent causality runs in the opposite direction. Some changes can be 
thought of as enabling, as permitting and encouraging a growth of demand that 
otherwise would be frustrated. 
One such is industrialization, if the alternative is seen as specialization in 
agriculture. Balance of payments considerations provide one reason for this. A 
country which tries to develop using agriculture as the leading sector must earn 
sufficient from its social rates of return, because of externalities, monopoly 
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power and other conditions which drive wedges between private and social val- 
uations. Another reason for caution is that the connections between financial 
deepening and the rest of the economy are complex, with various interactions, 
so that we need to be wary about imputing any one-way causality. Goldsmith's 
researches into the behaviour of the "financial interrelations ratio", reported ear- 
lier, by no means indicate any rigid or simple relationship and he was very reti- 
cent about imputing causality. However, more recent econometric tests do pro- 
vide some support for the view that causality runs from financial to "ieal" de- 
velopment and that developing countries whose financial systems have been a 
leading sector in development have experienced more rapid growth than those 
with lagging financial systems.19 Interestingly, and consistent with the ratios 
cited earlier, evidence was also found that beyond some level of income 
causality becomes reversed, with financial development becoming demand-led. 
Overall, we see that economic structures alter radically in the course of devel- 
opment. In doing so they are responding to, and interacting with, the oppor- 
tunities—and warning signals—generated by changing patterns of demand by 
consumers and producers, evolving factor proportions and technologies, and 
shifting comparative advantages in trade. These long-run patterns of change are, 
however, only the most visible ways in which an economy responds to stimuli 
and we should next consider other types of change to which economies need to 
respond. 
Cycles and shocks 
These additional factors are often expressed in terms of the need for economies 
to adjust to "shocks" of various kinds. We need to be careful about this lan- 
guage, however. A dictionary definition of a shock is "a sudden and violent ef- 
fect tending to impair the stability of something". A number of the variables we 
discuss below fall well within such a definition, but others do not. Some are 
more in the nature of trends of cyclical or longer duration. This is more than a 
quibble. If an economy is required to adjust to an adverse trend, this necessity 
can be expected to persist over a period of years but often will not involve very 
large changes in any one year. A shock, on the other hand, is likely to be more 
severe but of shorter duration. 
It is useful here to differentiate between influences from the outside world 
and those more domestic in nature. 
Influences from the outside world 
The importance of external influences has been increasing as the world becomes 
more and more integrated in trade and finance. During the last two decades there 
have been a number of developments in merchandise and capital markets which 
have worked to the disadvantage of developing countries, not least in Africa. 
Consortium members will be familiar with these and they will only be very 
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Some of the key features include: 
(a) The growth of industrial countries in the 1980s has been a good deal slower 
than in the 1970s, and there have also been large fluctuations around the 
trend (item 1). 
(b) There has been an even sharper deceleration in the growth of world trade, 
with growth in the 1980s less than half the rate of the preceding decade 
(item 2). One presumed reason for the decline in the potency of DC expan.- 
sion to create more trade is the growth in protectionism in this period.20 
The increased costs and uncertainties resulting from major-currency 
exchange rate instability is another probable 
(c) There have also been adverse trends on capital account (item 3), although 
this has affected most African countries less than, say, Latin America. 
(d) Large increases have occurred in the real level of world interest rates (item 
4), although the results differ greatly according to the deflator employed. 
Here again the impact on most African countries has probably been less 
than in other parts of the Third World. 
(e) Table 4 also records some of the consequences of the deteriorating trends 
just noted. Note the contrast between the experiences on the terms of trade 
as between the 1970s, when there was an improving trend, and the 1980s, 
when there was a sharp deterioration. The worst of this was attributable to 
the "second oil shock" at the beginning of the decade, but it is remarkable 
that subsequent falls in oil prices have not brought any major reversal in the 
weakness of the terms of trade. This result was, of course, related to the ad- 
verse conditions of world commodity markets discussed earlier. 
(f) African countries have had to cut back severely on imports (item 6), with 
the volume of imports in 1987 well below 1979 levels, especially if mea- 
sured in per capita terms. 
An additional way of approaching this matter is to estimate the combined 
effects of all the adverse developments described above. This has been done for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for which it has been estimated that the size of terms-of- 
trade losses, higher interest costs, reduced credit and private investment flows in 
1980—1986 amounted to $6.5 billion p.a. even after allowing for enlarged aid 
grants.22 This was equivalent to nearly a half of export earnings and about a 
third of total imports. 
Troubles at home 
It barely needs stating to Consortium members that it is as a response to the ex- 
ternal developments just summarized that so much emphasis has come to be 
placed on the needs for "structural adjustment". But apart from the influence of 
the world economy, there are more domestic difficulties with which 
economies—and economic policies—must cope. Climatic difficulties are the 
chief of these, and these too can be divided into shocks and trends. Perhaps the 
most spectacular example of a country plagued by unreliable climate is 
Bangladesh, chronically prone to floods and cyclones. During the period of 
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1960—1981 Bangladesh experienced no less than 17 major floods and 37 cy- 
clones, leading to a recorded loss of life of nearly 800,000 people (probably far 
more if the full facts could be known)23 and culminating in especially devastat- 
ing floods in 1988. The Sahelian zone of Africa is another region deeply af- 
fected by an unreliable climate where average rainfall is not only slight but an- 
nual variability is 30—40 percent around the mean. This brings with it 
vulnerability to droughts, greatly increasing the risk of farming. The famine that 
ravaged much of Africa in 1983—1984 was a dramatization of the unreliability of 
its rainfall. 
It may have signified more than that, however. There is now a growing con- 
sensus among scientists that a gradual warming-up of the earth's atmosphere is 
under way—what is known as the "hothouse" or "greenhouse" effect.24 The 
1983—1984 African drought was actually the culmination of 16 years of gradu- 
ally diminishing mean rainfall in the Sahel, beginning in the late 1960s. Thus, 
rainfall statistics for Mali indicate a 25 percent decline in mean rainfall, compar- 
ing 1968—1983 with 1934—1968, from 774 millimetres a year to 577. The same 
trend is apparent in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Niger. 
The hothouse effect, resulting principally from accumulations of carbon 
dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, may have dramatic effects on future rainfall 
patterns by changing flows of moisture-bearing air, even though it may affect 
average temperatures by only a few degrees. It seems probable that within the 
next 50 years the earth's temperature may be caused to rise by an average of 
1.50_4.50 centigrade. Even a global warming of 1.5°C over so brief a period 
could alter the earth's climate to an extent outside the range of experience dur- 
ing the last 10,000 years! The rainfall implications of such developments are not 
yet fully understood but, for example, are thought to place the Sahelian zone 
particularly at risk. 
Awareness that the problem is not so much the familiar risk of occasional 
climatic shocks but rather a far more protracted deterioration is only gradually 
dawning, however, and the countries at risk remain poorly prepared to cope with 
a succession of bad years. Not the least of the dangers is that in such situations 
the affected peoples will, left to fend for themselves, be forced to destroy their 
own productive resources—cattle, grazing and trees—in their attempts to sur- 
vive, thus creating a vicious circle. If indeed there is a hothouse effect, it repre- 
sents an enormous challenge to which policy-makers must respond and it could 
well be that twenty-first century studies of long-term structural change will find 
major shifts in response to this climatic factor. 
Organized violence is another "domestic" influence to mention, by which is 
meant civil and international wars, border incursions and the forcible overthrow 
of governments. The world is full of such events and they feed through to eco- 
nomic performance in many ways. An econometric study of Sub-Saharan Africa 
found a highly significant negative correlation between the incidence of vio- 
lence and economic growth, with causality running from violence to slower 
growth (Wheeler, 1984). Clearly an invasion or a coup d'etat is a "shock", but 
since the government is itself a protagonist it strains the language to talk of the 
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need to "adjust" to such a shock, so we will not consider it further here. 
What should also be mentioned, however, is that both organized violence and 
the climatic events mentioned earlier can result in major migrations of people, 
often across international boundaries, seeking peace and sustenance. There are 
large populations of refugees in many countries, and Africa had been described 
as "the continent of refugees" with at least 2.5 million refugees scattered across 
many African countries. The need to care for these large, sometimes sudden, in- 
fluxes amidst indigenous populations often already poor can also impose major 
economic strains, to say nothing of the political and security complications. 
Table 5 Indicators of domestic market size, circa 1985, (country averages; $ billion 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Small low-income countriesb 12.1 2.8 2.2 0.6 0.4 
Large low-income countriesb 509.5 148.5 92.1 21.2 47.5 
Middle-income countries 21.9 32.2 20.3 6.7 7.4 
Industrial market economies 39.0 1373.4 851.4 323.6 288.4 
Source: Computed from "World Development Indicator' tables of World Bank, World Development 
Report, 1988, Tables 1,3, 5 and 6. 
Notes: (a) An approximate indicator only, calculated from share of private consumption devoted to 
clothing and footwear, and "other consumption" as a rough proxy for expenditures on 
manufactures. 
(b) "Small" and "large" are defined as countries with populations of under and over 50 mil 
lion. The "large low-income country" group consists of Bangladesh, China, India and 
Pakistan. 
Although it fits neither into the category of a shock nor a trend, the size of an 
economy should be mentioned here as exerting a powerful influence on its eco- 
nomic structure and on its degrees of freedom in choosing a preferred pattern of 
development. This has already been mentioned in connection with the strong in- 
verse correlation between the size and openness of an economy. In small 
economies, and given the widespread importance of economies of scale, inter- 
national trade is of special importance in permitting an escape from the narrow 
confines of the domestic market. For such economies, not merely the pattern of 
industrialization but also its possibility will hinge crucially on being able to 
achieve such an escape. This is illustrated in Table 5 which shows the dramati- 
cally smaller size of the domestic market, especially for manufactures, in the 
small low-income countries characteristic of Africa. 
Mention should be made too of population growth, not merely because of its 
influence on economy size but as a long-term force strongly influencing the in- 
tensity of exploitation of natural resources, the trend and composition of de- 
mand, and factor proportions. The literature on the so-called demographic tran- 
sition is highly pertinent to consideration of long-run relationships between this 
variable and indicators of economic development. 
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Favourable shocks 
Not all "shocks" are adverse. Good weather can bring bumper harvests. 
Commodity prices can boom as well as slump: But economies (and policies) 
need to react to favourable changes no less than to adverse ones. Take the ex- 
ample of an unexpected but temporary increase in the world price of a country's 
chief commodity export, such as the boom in coffee prices in the late 1970s.25 
Such a development will commonly raise tax revenues, either directly, as in the 
case of export taxes, or indirectly, as a result of the higher level of economic ac- 
tivity which the commodity boom will generate. Faced with an unexpected 
bonus of larger revenues the government will be tempted to step up its own 
spending, by raising civil-service salaries, expanding various activities, or start- 
ing new capital projects. The larger export earnings will increase the liquidity of 
the banking system and enable them to expand their lending to domestic bor- 
rowers. There may also be increased willingness by foreign banks to provide 
new credits, increasing external indebtedness. 
Increased spending in both the public and private sectors will suck in addi- 
tional imports, weakening the beneficial effects to the balance of payments of 
higher export earnings and putting pressure on the general price level. These 
effects may be magnified by a diversion of resources out of other exports and 
goods for the home market in response to the higher commodity prices. 
When the boom ends and commodity prices go back down again, the gov- 
ernment and private sectors alike will find it much harder to cut back than it was 
to expand. As Figure 2 illustrates for Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, any cut in gov- 
ernment spending will likely lag well behind the declines in revenue, leaving it 
with an enlarged budget deficit that will threaten both inflation and the balance 
of payments. Moreover, experience suggests that the new projects which were 
quickly embarked upon during the boom will often not have been carefully 
considered and will do little for economic development. It is likely also that the 
monetary authorities will have difficulty in cutting back adequately on credit to 
private borrowers, thus further adding to excess demand in the economy. In the 
worst case—of which there are examples—the economy ends up in a weaker 
state than it was at the beginning of the boom. Without careful management—to 
neutralize much of the expansionary fiscal, monetary and income effects and 
husband the windfall gains for use when world prices slump—"favourable" 
shocks can be bad news! 
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Figure 2 Government revenues and expenditures during commodity booms 
dIvoire 
PsrCIntog. of GOP 
40 lOOM 
978 981 984 
Note: Both revenue and expenditures exclude transfers, so their difference is not equal to an 
overall public sector balance. figures for Kenya are for central government only. 
Source: World Development Report, 1988, Fig. 3.6. 
Research issues 
If it is accepted that the above factors represent positive and negative stimuli to 
which economies must adapt, it becomes important for individual countries to 
have a clear understanding of the precise nature of the challenges they face, and 
are likely to face in the future. Most of the external, and some of the domestic, 
factors discussed above impinge upon the economy through the balance of pay- 
ments. Indeed, the foreign exchange constraint is of special importance in con- 
sidering how the economies of Africa should adapt to contemporary realities. 
Policies for the management of the balance of payments have been at the centre 
of the Consortium's research from the outset, and much of its past work could 
be interpreted as an attempt to clarify the nature of the adjustments required and 
the policies that could most efficiently be employed to achieve them. To this 
extent, there is no need to suggest additional research topics. However, a few 
additional ones can be suggested which go beyond the traditional focus of 
Consortium-supported research: 
(a) Investigations of income elasticities of demand for imports and domestic 
products, and the income elasticity of household and corporate saving; 
(b) Long-run trends in world demand for the country's principal exports, in- 
cluding the determinants thereof; 
(c) Long-run trends in the country's commodity, income and factoral terms of 
trade; economic and policy responses to these; 
Kenya 
975 1978 1981 984 1986 
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(d) Studies of the ways in which terms of trade shocks and trends (including 
favourable ones) affect the domestic economy and how it responds; the 
sensitivity of these to the commodity composition of trade; 
(e) Impact on the economy of trends in world interest rates and the sensitivity 
of this to the size and financing of current account deficits, the country's 
debt portfolio and its external assets; 
(f) Extent and impact of any import compression and import instability; the 
effects of these on domestic economic performance;26 the sensitivity of the 
effects to changes in import rationing mechanisms, e.g. shifts from QRs to 
tariff equivalents; 
(g) Dutch disease in the tropics: the impact on lagging sectors of the economy 
of booming natural-resource-based export sectors in such countries as 
Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia and implications foreconomic manage- 
ment;27 
(h) Following Jung, 1988, is it possible to establish any relationships between 
developments (positive or negative) in the financial system with the per- 
formance of the remainder of the economy, including causality tests; 
(i) There may be fruitful possibilities for collaborative research with country 
meteorologists, agriculturalists and others into long-run climatic trends and 
prospects, and their possible implications for policy. This is particularly 
with the hothouse effect in mind. One of the analytical issues thrown up 
will be about policy formation in conditions of large uncertainty. 
IV. The adaptive economy 
Recapitulation 
The view presented so far is that economic structures alter radically over time, 
responding to the stimuli—positive and negative—generated by changing pat- 
terns of demand by consumers and producers, evolving factor proportions and 
technologies, shifting comparative advantages in trade, and shorter-term exter- 
nal and domestic shocks and trends. Our analysis suggests that an economy with 
a flexible structure, which can more readily adjust to the changing needs of the 
time, is liable to achieve faster development. Conversely, an economy with a 
rigid structure, incapable of readily meeting new needs, can expect retarded de- 
velopment, with disjunctures between demand and supply creating bottlenecks 
and balance of payments strains, inflationary pressures and other economic dis- 
locations. 
These observations are consistent with econometric tests of correlation be- 
tween the growth of an economy and its "balance", i.e. its ability to grow in 
conformity to income elasticities of demand. These show a consistent and uni- 
form negative correlation between unbalance and growth, and also that the more 
advanced economies have tended in the past to grow in a roughly balanced 
manner.28 The frequent severity of adverse shocks and cyclical developments 
constitute further reasons for placing a premium on the flexibility of an econ- 
omy and on the policies which influence that. Taken together, the various argu- 
ments create a powerful prima facie expectation that countries blessed with such 
adaptability will be much better able to satisfy the material aspirations of their 
citizens than those which are not. 
The structuralist-neoclassical divide and the role of policy 
A key question that remains is whether the economy's responses are best re- 
garded as more-or-less incidental and automatic outcomes or whether they need 
to be induced by changes in policy. Lurking beneath this question is another: 
how do we perceive economies as working? In the neoclassical tradition 
economists stress the efficiency of market mechanisms. Structural change is 
thought of as a largely autonomous response brought about fairly smoothly 
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through price signals, the mobility of factors between alternative uses, and the 
ability of entrepreneurs to exert foresight and anticipate future needs in the 
search for maximum rates of return on their capital. Economists in the 
structuralist tradition take a more sceptical view of the efficacy of markets in 
developing-country environments and of the prospects for low-friction 
adaptation: "The structuralist approach attempts to identify specific rigidities, 
lags and other characteristics of the structure of developing economies that 
affect economic adjustments and the choice of development policy".29 
However, one of the effects of the 1980s' interest in issues of structural ad- 
justment has been to erode the previously rather sharp distinction between the 
neoclassical and structuralist schools. As Hirschman (1981, pp. 181—82) has 
wryly noted, there is a real sense in which we are all structuralists now: 
Whereas the Latin American economists who had first advanced the struc- 
turalist thesis were in general identified with the Left, it now appears that 
structuralist theorising is a game at which all kinds of believers in the need 
for "fundamental" reform can and do play. 
A more positive way of putting this is to suggest that there is general agree- 
ment in the literature that adjustment is likely to be particularly costly in output, 
employment and welfare foregone unless appropriate policy responses are put in 
place. There remain large disagreements about what "appropriate policies" 
should consist of, but even here there is agreement that a blend of market and 
non-market oriented policies is required, with the disagreements being about 
where the balance should be struck. Disagreements remain on the extent to 
which developing economies are different from those of the industrial countries 
in the degree of market failure that exists, and also about the efficacy of the state 
as an economic agent. But to say that markets are a prime mechanism of adjust- 
ment and structural change is not very controversial, any more than it is to urge 
the importance of an active policy response. 
It might at this point be helpful to offer some definitions, building on the no- 
tion that some changes will be more or less autonomous and others policy-in- 
duced: 
Adjustment can be thought of as induced or planned adaptation. Adjustment 
policies are then the instruments deployed in order to achieve the desired 
adaptation and to enhance the flexibility of the economy. "Structural" ad- 
justment should logically be regarded as measures to adapt specifically 
structural variables, as discussed earlier, particularly the productive system 
and the physical and institutional infrastructure. 
It may also be useful to categorize adjustment measures as either defensive— 
seeking to minimize the costs of adjustment or slow it down—or positive, 
emphasizing the opportunities created by changing conditions, seeking to antici- 
pate them and to increase the flexibility of the economy.30 Many adjustment 
measures introduced in the industrial countries, for example, have been defen- 
sive, seeking to shore up declining industries or to ameliorate the social and 
political effects of such declines. hnposition by developing countries of ex- 
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change controls to cope with balance of payments difficulties may be viewed in 
a similarly negative light. The policies of the South Korean government might 
be cited as an instance of a positive approach, taking an active view of how the 
country's comparative advantage should develop and meeting protectionism and 
a burgeoning debt-servicing burden with aggressive export-promotion policies. 
In the sense that they have generally introduced policy changes with varying de- 
grees of reluctance and only in the face of crisis conditions, the adjustment 
policies of most African governments in the 1980s could be said to have been 
essentially defensive. Apart from the rather special case of Botswana, it is hard 
to think of an African example of positive, anticipatory adjustment policies. 
Positive adjustment policies, we have suggested, seek to increase the adapt- 
ability of the economy. But if they are to do that we need to know what it is that 
determines economic flexibility, and it is to this topic that we turn next. 
Unfortunately, this has not been one of the traditional questions of economics so 
the following sketch is necessarily rather tentative. 
Determinants of adaptability—overview 
Expressed in its broadest terms, the view presented below is that an adaptive 
economy is one in which ends and means are readily adjusted to changing con- 
straints and opportunities. This includes flexibility in the institutional base of the 
socio-economic system, and responsiveness by the government in adapting 
policies to changing conditions. It implies an economy in which only limited 
frictions and costs are involved in the movement of resources among alternative 
employments, leading to changing factor proportions, technologies and compo- 
sition of output. On the side of demand, it implies responsiveness to changing 
relative scarcities, and comparative ease of substitution in the disposition of in- 
come as between consumption and saving. 
The extent to which an economy possesses adaptability of this type is seen as 
depending, in turn, on two sets of conditions. First, there must be efficient in- 
formational incentive systems. There have to be adequate data on changes in 
economic conditions to which the economy must adapt, and there also has to be 
a way of giving people incentives to bring about those changes which the data 
indicate to be desirable. Given the information and incentives, the second set of 
conditions relates to the reactions of people to these stimuli, their responsiveness 
to economic signals. We will discuss these two sets of conditions in that order. 
Information and incentives 
Every economy requires some means of making the huge number of decisions 
that have to be taken about what should be produced and in what quantities, 
about investment, employment and so on, and of co-ordinating these so that the 
preferences of producers and consumers can be made consistent. The literature 
on comparative economic systems concentrates on the dichotomy between the 
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ways these desiderata are achieved in market and planned economies, although 
in practice it is always through some combination of the two. 
The distinguishing characteristic of the market economy is the high degree of 
decentralization of decision-making through the impersonal workings of a myr- 
iad of markets, in which enterprises and individuals pursue their own interests 
by responding to the incentive signals of market prices and in which the interac- 
tions between markets can be thought of as a mechanism of co-ordination. A 
centrally planned economy stands at the opposite end of the spectrum, for it is 
characterized by a high degree of centralization, with decision-making powers 
concentrated in the planning authorities of the state. Planners receive and pro- 
cess information about the economy and take the most important decisions. It is 
they who play the co-ordination role, but this is achieved through the conscious 
exercise of forethought rather than through the "invisible hand" of the market. 
We cannot here go into the huge debate about the relative merits of the mar- 
ket and planning solutions to the co-ordination problem, but two points may be 
noted. First, there has been a clear shift of professional opinion about this during 
the last two decades. Economists are now more inclined to acknowledge the 
sometimes high costs of planning and other state interventions and to hold that 
the market system offers a generally more efficient co-ordination mechanism.31 
The second point is that in the face of both market and state failures most 
countries have opted for "mixed" economies, in which most production is under- 
taken in the private sector and the basic allocative mechanism is a market sys- 
tem, modified in greater or lesser degree by government "interventions". In what 
follows we will take the mixed-economy case. But however the balance is struck 
between the market and the state, we should note the importance of adequate 
information flows. The adaptive economy needs good intelligence: about chang- 
ing conditions in world trade and finance; about developments within the do- 
mestic economy; about scientific matters, e.g. as they bear upon technological 
progress and climatic changes; and about how these and other variables interact 
with each other. 
However obvious this may sound, in many countries economic data are still 
sparse, unreliable and out of date. In such circumstances, neither private nor 
government decision-makers can operate efficiently. Thus, governments have 
lurched into a debt problem simply because they did not know the rate at which 
debts were being accumulated; businessmen have over-invested because they 
did not know about investments elsewhere; governments and their citizens have 
experienced famines because "early warning" information systems were not in 
place. Because of the incomplete appropriability of information, and for other 
reasons, it cannot be assumed that market incentives will throw up necessary in- 
formation, or make it available to all who need it. Governments everywhere thus 
include information-gathering as being among their tasks. 
There is little controversy about the desirability of this, but in developing 
countries data flows often remain woefully inadequate. Flexibility is bound to be 
limited in the face of severely limited knowledge of the changes in circumstance 
to which the economy must adapt. 
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Information is not enough, however. It must then be fed into decision systems 
and translated into rewards and penalties that will induce appropriate responses. 
It is here that markets generally excel. Their decentralized nature, their ability to 
translate information into price incentives and to co-ordinate a huge number of 
individual decisions through an interacting network of markets are usually well 
in advance of what central planners can hope to achieve. Quite apart from the 
huge volume of information that planners need to be able to receive and absorb, 
one problem is that controls often create incentives for misinformation. State 
enterprises exaggerate their output or efficiency in order to secure larger alloca- 
tions of supplies. Private firms exaggerate their costs in order to persuade the 
government to raise controlled prices. Exporters understate the value of their 
sales in order to retain some of the foreign exchange they earn. Borrowers miss- 
state the uses for which they require a loan to get access to funds earmarked by 
government policy for other uses. And so on. 
In short, we see a well-functioning market system as conducive to flexibility 
when compared with an economy dominated by planning and controls. The key 
expression, however, is "well-functioning", for there are many factors which 
prevent markets from achieving maximum efficiency, particularly when looked 
at from a social viewpoint. It is the existence of such market failures which 
constitutes the case for state intervention in a mixed economy, always provided 
that the costs of the interventions are smaller than the benefits produced. We re- 
turn to this topic of market failure shortly. 
Responsiveness 
Turning now to consider the responsiveness of economic agents to information 
and incentives, it is useful to consider two related aspects: receptivity to change; 
and price elasticities. 
Receptivity to change 
The influence of tradition provides a natural starting point. However, economists 
are not well equipped for the study of such subjects and judgements about this 
are inevitably highly controversial. These are subjects we need to study further. 
In the meantime, we hypothesize that the adaptive economy requires a popula- 
tion which is receptive to change and is marked by willingness to take action to 
maximize whatever material benefits may be derived from changing conditions 
(or to minimize the costs). This implies an individualistic welfare-maximizing 
approach, and mobility in pursuit of this objective. These attributes may clash 
with traditional values, which often place more stress on the value of collective 
well-being and erect a number of obstacles to mobility. 
The pursuit of economic self-improvement, for example, requires some faith 
that advancement will be on the basis of personal ability and effort. Traditional 
values may undermine such faith. Promotion may be more on the basis of Se- 
niority, or family, or tribe. An attribute of a wide range of traditional societies is 
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that they deny equality of opportunity to women, discouraging the education and 
weakening the economic incentives of over half the population. Equality of op- 
portunity is often also denied on ethnic grounds, where a dominant tribe or race 
holds down the progress of others and gives preferment to its own members. 
Traditional values may also be opposed to the self-regarding pursuit of mate- 
rial well-being. Extended-family obligations, for instance, may weaken incen- 
tives when a person may believe that there is little use in trying to improve his 
lot because the benefits will have to be shared among numerous, more-or-less 
distant, relatives. There may be similar traditional influences standing in the 
of, or weakening the incentives for, public servants adopting the role-orientation 
necessary for the efficient conduct of their duties. In short, traditional values 
may be at odds with the "modernization" of outlook which is necessary for the 
adaptive economy. On the other hand, Japan's is only one of a number of highly 
successful socio-economic systems which does not conform to the Western in- 
dividualistic model and where tradition still exerts a potent influence, illustrating 
how hard it is to offer firm generalizations in this area. 
Education is of key importance in this context, both in its extent and its qual- 
ity. The educated person will understand more of his or her environment and 
how he or she can influence and take advantage of it. He or she will be more 
knowledgeable about changing opportunities and more self-confident of being 
able to take advantage of them. It is from the well educated that any upwardly- 
mobile middle class with capitalistic values is most likely to be created, and it is 
from this group that most modernization is likely to originate. It is they who 
may then come to serve as exemplars to the rest of the population, an implicit 
invitation for them also to shed the influence of tradition. 
Religion is another potent force. Perhaps the key question here is what a reli- 
gion teaches concerning man's relationship to her or his environment. Some 
faiths see man's fate as predetermined by God's will and acceptance of poverty 
in this world as a mere prelude to a better life to come in the next. Such is not a 
faith that is likely to encourage enterprising self-help in response to a changing 
environment. Passive fatalism is a more likely result, dulling responsiveness to 
economic challenges. The Buddhist and Hindu religions are perhaps most often 
associated with such teachings. Conversely, the Christian and Jewish faiths are 
frequently viewed as emphasizing the individual's responsibility for his actions 
and well-being, with the "Protestant ethic" sometimes being particularly associ- 
ated with capitalistic values—although the dynamic and flexible economies of 
Southeast Asia demonstrate that no one value system has an exclusive claim to 
produce economic success. More generally, religion is often seen as a conserva- 
tive force, a protector of traditional values, resistant to modernization and mate- 
rialism. Some religions have placed limited value on secular education; many 
have registered scientific explanations of the world's workings as conflicting 
with religious teachings. The validity and influence of such considerations re- 
mains highly controversial, however, not the least because of large differences 
within all the main religions. The sensitivity of this topic becomes immediately 
obvious as soon as one begins to mention particular faiths. 
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None of the above is, in any case, intended to denigrate the influences of tra- 
dition and religion. Some traditional modes are also dynamic and the individual- 
istic pursuit of self-welfare that lies at the heart of the capitalist ethic scarcely 
represents man's most elevated social or moral state. Moreover, some reject the 
validity of the "modernization" model of development that is implicit in the 
above. Our task here is not to argue the pros and cons of these viewpoints but 
the narrower one of clarifying the nature of an adaptive economy. Similarly, our 
remarks on the influence of tradition should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
there are major societies which are unresponsive to material incentives. The evi- 
dence provides few such examples, indicating rather that "economic man" popu- 
lates all countries. The negative influences we have been referring to are best 
viewed as dulling responses, reducing elasticities, not usually as giving rise to 
"perverse" responses. 
The supply of entrepreneurship is another important influence on responsive- 
ness to change. The most important characteristics of an entrepreneur for present 
purposes is that he or she thinks ahead, takes an active interest in information 
about economic trends, looks for opportunities, moves quickly in order to be a 
step ahead of competitors, tries to anticipate future opportunities, is willing to 
take risks, to innovate, to embrace the unfamiliar. An economy with an ample 
supply of such dynamic characters should be a flexible one. Unfortunately, en- 
terprise of this kind is unevenly distributed within and across peoples.32 There is 
no assurance that there will be an adequate supply of this quality in an economy, 
and there can result what has been called a "creative" market failure, a failure to 
invest and innovate on an adequate scale.33 
Even more unfortunately, we understand little about the determinants of the 
supply of entrepreneurship, still less about how it may be encouraged by eco- 
nomic policy. The issue has strong links with the above discussion of the de- 
terminants of public attitudes towards change. Societies which value individual- 
ity and award status to the prosperous provide an environment which is presum- 
ably more conducive to the flowering of enterprise. Societies which are cultur- 
ally rich are perhaps more likely to engender the self-confidence that the en- 
trepreneur must possess. But it may be that entrepreneurship is rather a response 
of disadvantaged groups, those denied status by society at large, who cannot ex- 
pect normal preferment to push them up the ladder (Hagen, 1962). On this view, 
we would expect entrepreneurial groups to emerge particularly from minorities 
of various kinds, including immigrants. The important role of the Indian and 
Lebanese communities in commerce and manufacturing in Africa is an example. 
Plunging yet further into the quicksands of amateur sociology, we come next 
to a variety of factors that influence receptivity to change and which relate to the 
nature and actions of governments. The influence of political systems was 
among the issues explored by Kuznets (1966, pp. 445—53) in the 1960s. 
Comparing the political structures of developing and developed countries, he 
saw the latter as unstable, ineffectual and ambiguous about the merits of mod- 
ernization; less representative, less tolerant of interest groups, with power more 
concentrated and more personalized. Kuznets noted that modern economic 
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growth was achieved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by countries 
which by the 1960s had political structures quite different from those then pre- 
vailing in developing countries. But he went beyond that to suggest that the 
characteristics just noted constitute formidable obstacles to economic growth in 
many developing countries: "Political instability and nonrepresentativeness of 
the regimes, combined with an authoritarian structure dominated by personalist 
leaders and backed by familial and ethnic ties and the police, are hardly 
favourable conditions for economic growth" (p. 453). The influence of tradi- 
tional values on governments and their resulting ambiguity about the desirability 
of modernization observed Kuznets is a situation which has been illustrated 
in the 1 980s by the spread of an Islamic fundamentalism which appears to reject 
much of the modernization model. 
Of course, far from all developing countries have political systems with the 
characteristics mentioned above. Much has happened since the 1960s, particu- 
larly in Latin America. Moreover, there is no suggestion that there is some sim- 
ple, mechanistic connection running from political modernization to economic 
development. Indeed, economic development is itself likely to generate increas- 
ing pressures for political democratization. Nevertheless, there are enough reso- 
nances between Kuznets' observations and the contemporary scene in Africa 
and elsewhere for us to take his comments seriously, and enough developing 
countries have experienced adjustment difficulties that emanate from the politi- 
cal system for his warning to be underlined.34 
Even if there is in power a modernizing government which values flexibility, 
that is far from being the end of the matter. Another factor bearing upon its abil- 
ity to encourage adaptability will be the government's strength relative to other 
centres of power. Many developing societies are fragmented, with power widely 
dispersed and limited social cohesion. Various groups will be forces to be reck- 
oned with, even by apparently authoritarian governments. In the general case, 
special interest groups are conservative and defensive of existing privileges of 
their constituents, whether they represent employers, organized labour, 
landowners or whatever. To bring about economic adaptation, governments are 
likely to have to persuade such groups to accept change or to enforce it against 
their wishes, but they may not have the power to achieve the latter. A result of a 
fragmented society is that the state will tend to be "soft", by which is meant a 
situation in which policies decided upon are often not enforced and the authori- 
ties are reluctant to place obligations upon their citizens, including the obliga- 
tion to pay due taxes. 
This issue of the power of government vis a vis traditional centres of influ- 
ence and special interest groups is of particular importance because adjustment 
to the type of economic shocks described in the previous section involves tough 
decisions and substantial costs.35 Given the inevitably painful and costly nature 
of adjustment, at least in the short term, the politics of adjustment are liable to 
confront the government with the interests of important groups, not the least of 
which will be its own bureaucracy. Adjustment policies are then only likely to 
prevail if the government can successfully evade such confrontation or assert its 
32 SPECIAL PAPER 2 
authorities. 
This consideration has led some observers to suggest that successful adjust- 
ment requires strong, authoritarian governments, but this should be tempered by 
the consideration that the power of a government to implement and gain accep- 
tance of its policies will be strongly influenced by what political scientists call 
its "legitimacy"—a belief by the general public that it has a proper claim to ex- 
ercise authority, derived from some constitutional or other principle. 
Authoritarian governments, often military, tend to be short on legitimacy. In 
fact, the evidence on the relationship between regime type and ability to imple- 
ment major programmes of policy reform is indecisive. Indeed, it is not even 
clear that regime type is a key determinant.36 
Finally, under this heading, we should mention a delicate balance to be struck 
between flexibility and continuity in government policies. Modern macroeco- 
nomic theory has taught us the importance of the ways in which people react 
to—and seek to anticipate—government actions, and of the techniques that 
people develop for frustrating government intentions.37 Corruption and parallel 
markets are examples of the latter. To have maximum effect policies must be 
credible; people must believe they will be implemented and will stick.38 Thus, if 
the government embarks on a currency devaluation, economic agents must take 
the new exchange rate as reliable basis for decisions about the future. Signals 
have to be believed. This is a reason why "soft" states have difficulty in improv- 
ing the performance of the economy: citizens do not believe that the government 
means what it says, or can enforce its decisions. This is also a reason for valuing 
political stability, for who can plan on the reliability of some new policy signal 
if the government has only a brief life expectancy? 
Although we should again stress the tentative nature of much of this discus- 
sion, it seems likely that economic responsiveness will be much enhanced when 
these various conditions for receptivity to change are satisfied. In the language 
of economics, price elasticities will be larger. 
Supply elasticities 
To the extent that information is available and translated into price incentives, 
responsiveness is enhanced by relatively large price elasticities of demand and 
of particular importance of supply. A logical next step, therefore, would be to 
survey the factors bearing upon the size of supply elasticities. This, however, is 
the subject of a separate AERC paper by Ademola Oyejide, (1990), therefore we 
will not go over the same ground here. Very briefly, we see long-run supply 
elasticities as being crucially influenced by the extent of competition and ab- 
sence of dualism; and the availability of raw materials and other intermediate 
inputs (with the import strangulation mentioned earlier tending to reduce supply 
elasticities), including complementary infrastructure. 
The only other point that needs to be mentioned here is that elasticities are 
larger in the long run than in the short. This points to a dilemma. Often countries 
faced with severe payments or other disequilibria need quick results. Certainly, 
many of the adjustment programmes with which the IMF and, to a lesser extent, 
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the World Bank are associated are predicted on quick results. Elasticities and the 
responses they measure are generally small in the short term, however, which 
points to a danger in relying too greatly on market forces for rapid structural 
change.39 
Matters arising 
Before concluding our exploration of the characteristics of an adaptive econ- 
omy, there are two additional questions that deserve an airing. 
The first takes us back to the relationship between adaptability and develop- 
ment. Even though we were cautious about attributing causality from structural 
transformation to development, the thrust of the earlier parts of this paper was, 
nonetheless, to stress the beneficial effects of economic flexibility for long-term 
development. However, reconsidering what is written above about the nature of 
an adaptive economy, it is equally clear that development aids flexibility. 
Consider the reasons for this. 
First, the data base and flows of new information will be superior in a more 
developed economy because it will be feasible to devote larger resources to this 
task and also because a larger part of economic activity will take place within 
"organized" sectors of the economy that are more amenable to measurement. 
Second, the hold of traditional values and modes is likely to be weaker, and 
modernizing attitudes more the norm. Third, the economy will be more industri- 
alized. For reasons already mentioned, this will give greater potential for rapid 
response of output to changing price relativitles, and factors of production will 
be less specific than in the primary sectors. Partly because the domestic market 
will be larger, there will be more competition among domestic producers, in- 
creasing their incentives to be responsive. Markets will be better integrated and 
dualism reduced, for dualism is particularly a feature of less developed 
economies. Markets can be expected to be more complete and in other respects 
we would expect the market mechanism to work better. 
The larger size of developed economies is an advantage in other ways. They 
will be less vulnerable to shocks transmitted from the rest of the world (see be- 
low). They will have more diversified patterns of demand and production, facili- 
tating the movement of resources between activities.40 It will also be easier to 
shift between production for the home and export markets. Finally, we would 
expect there to be at least some tendency for governments to be less "soft", more 
effective, in developed countries. The only major special disadvantage of more 
developed economies that may be mentioned is the greater difficulty they may 
have in modernizing their capital stock, with net investment being small relative 
to the size of the existing capital. 
An implication of this is that small poor countries are liable to have inflexible 
economies. There is, thus, something of a vicious circle at work: inflexibility re- 
tards development but under-development retards flexibility. However, it would 
not be justified to go so far as to describe this as a low-level trap. The relation- 
ship between flexibility and development is unlikely to be so strong as to deter- 
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mine outcomes, and there are things that governments of even the poorest coun- 
tries can do to increase the adaptability of their economies. What is clear, how- 
ever, is that they will face an uphill task and will require more time for it than 
more advanced economies. It is for such reasons that there have been calls for 
the Bank and Fund to recognize these special needs in their policies towards 
African and other low-income countries. 
What is true of the disadvantages of low-income developing countries can be 
written even larger for such economies that have also experienced sustained and 
major economic disintegration, such as Ghana and Uganda. For they are likely 
to be faced with a decaying physical and institutional infrastructure, a major 
brain drain, an extreme but complex pattern of price distortions, a history of 
declining living standards that makes it all the harder to extract yet further sac- 
rifices in pursuit of economic revival, a history of economic and political insta- 
bility which makes people deeply sceptical about using present prices and poli- 
cies as bases for decisions about the future, and a lack of the optimism about the 
future necessary for a revival of investment. It is in this light that the problems 
and efforts of such countries should be viewed. 
Since all African economies are heavily dependent on international trade, the 
further question arises, is openness good for economic flexibility? The answer is 
yes. We have already remarked that one of the advantages of trade is that it al- 
lows local manufacturers to escape the extremely tight confines of domestic de- 
mand illustrated in Table 5 above, to specialize more and achieve more 
economies of scale.41 Openness also exposes local producers to more competi- 
tion than could be sustained domestically, and this is likely to make them more 
responsive to changing conditions and opportunities. 
The high levels of imports which mark the open economy also have the ad- 
vantage of giving lower-cost access to intermediate and capital goods that could 
be produced at home only very inefficiently, and to the technological advances 
incorporated in them. More generally, a society which is thoroughly exposed to 
commerce with, and investment from, the rest of the world is more likely to be 
aware of actual and prospective trends, more receptive to new ideas. Finally, the 
economic policies that governments must adopt if they actively promote an out- 
ward-oriented development strategy will themselves probably lead to greater 
economic efficiency and better ability to adjust to external shocks.42 
Against these considerations, we must, however, set the fact that open 
economies are more vulnerable to shocks from the outside world, relative to the 
scale of domestic economic activity. The greater instability of world economic 
conditions over most of the last 20 years has increased the risks and costs asso- 
ciated with integration into it. Openness both facilitates flexibility and necessi- 
tates it. What seems to be indicated, then, is a judicious blend of policies in- 
tended both to protect the economy from the worst of these risks (for example, 
by opting for a measure of self-sufficiency in food production and by placing 
more weight on other forms of import-substitution) and to open it up to the op- 
portunities of trade and investment. 
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Research issues 
The general lines of enquiry suggested by the foregoing are (a) to treat our vari- 
ous suggestions of the determinants of economic flexibility as hypotheses for 
testing, and (b) to study the influence of various characteristics of national 
economies on their ability to adjust. The more specific possibilities that suggest 
themselves are: 
(a) The adequacy of data flows to the government and other economic agents 
to monitor or anticipate the emergence of difficulties and opportunities. A 
project could, for example, evaluate the adequacy of data relating to the 
balance of payments and/or external debts for their effective management; 
or the feasibility of setting up a system of "leading indicators" such as exist 
in industrial countries. 
(b) Studies of the supply and characteristics of indigenous entrepreneurial 
groups, and the ways in which government actions impinge upon them, for 
good or ill. 
(c) Political economy studies of policy formation processes, with a view to 
forming an assessment of the constraints upon adequate policy responses to 
emerging problems.43 
(d) Studies of the past behaviour of state-determined producer prices as a basis 
for longer-term investment decisions. To the extent that they have done so, 
have producers been rational, in terms of profitability and risk, in using 
such prices for saving and investment decisions? Is it possible to compare 
this situation with other products whose prices are market determined? 
It would be possible to extend this list, particularly in sociological directions, 
but that may not be very helpful to the Consortium; Oyejide's paper on supply 
responses (Oyejide 1990) includes research suggestions that are highly pertinent 
to the study of the flexibility of the economies of Africa. 
V. Concluding comments 
Fund and Bank approaches 
The first question we take up in this concluding section is how the foregoing 
might be related to the approaches adopted by the Bretton Woods institutions, 
and by the governments with whom they have agreed programmes of "structural 
adjustment". In fact, the term first entered into international parlance when, in 
1980, the World Bank introduced Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) as a new 
type of credit.44 SALs were intended to provide quick-disbursing loans to fi- 
nance general imports over a period a years in support of an agreed set of mea- 
sures intended to strengthen the balance of payments whilst maintaining a de- 
velopment momentum. During the course of the 1980s, however, the original 
emphasis in the Bank on the balance of payments gradually faded, with a corre- 
sponding increase in the stress it placed upon "economy-wide programmes of 
reforms" intended to increase the efficiency of resource use through "changes in 
pricing and trade policies, in the size and structure of government expenditures, 
and in the extent of government controls on productive activity". However, there 
was no attempt at a formal definition of structural adjustment per Se, and even 
within the Bank the term is subject to a range on interpretations. In operational 
terms, the Bank in the most recent years has switched emphasis from SALs to 
Sectoral Adjustment Loans. The latter have narrower policy objectives, although 
the general policy thrust is similar. 
The subject was further complicated when in 1986 a new Structural 
Adjustment Facility was set up within the IMF. This too was to provide 
medium-term balance of payments assistance to low-income countries facing 
protracted balance of payments difficulties for a programme of policy measures 
to be worked out with the staffs of the IMF and the Bank. This was replaced at 
the end of 1987 by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, with consider- 
ably greater resources than the original SAF. In some respects, the Extended 
Facility of the Fund (EFF), set up in 1974, was a precursor of the SAF, not the 
least because, for the first time, it engaged the IMF in medium-term policy pro- 
grammes addressed to the strengthening of the productive structure.45 
Consistent with the Fund's objectives, the chief aim in each of these facilities 
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was stated to be to help countries achieve balance of payments viability. In most 
cases, the supply-side measures written into their programmes were in addition 
to the Fund's traditional emphasis on short-term demand management, involv- 
ing credit restrictions and reduced budget deficits, although accompanied by ex- 
change-rate depreciations (which can be interpreted as being chiefly structural in 
their intended effects). Like the Bank, the Fund does not appear to have offered 
a formal definition of structural adjustment. 
It is apparent that there are large areas of overlap between the ways in which 
the Bretton Woods institutions interpret structural adjustment and our own ac- 
count of the matter. Common to them all are the ideas that structural adjustment 
is a response to shocks and other changes in the economic environment; that it 
involves policy changes, i.e. is a planned adaptation; that it is not a short-term 
process; and that it involves attention to an economy's basic structure. Important 
differences may be noted, however, concerning breadth and length. 
As regards breadth, our own approach has stressed a wider range of influ- 
ences to which economies must adapt than those to which, understandably, the 
Fund and Bank confine themselves. We agree with them about the special im- 
portance of the foreign exchange constraint, but also bring in factors such as 
changing climatic conditions, technological progress and long-term shifts in the 
pattern of demand. 
The point about length is more important. It has to do with the speed with 
which economies are able to respond to changing circumstances and to the pe- 
riod over which such responsiveness is necessary. It is a long-standing com- 
plaint about the IMF's policies towards developing countries that its pro- 
grammes are too short-term to be able to cope with the often deep-seated nature 
of their payments' weaknesses. The EFF, SAF and ESAF are responses to this 
complaint. Even the Bank's more medium-term programmes have been criti- 
cized along similar lines, and its own evaluations of SALs have drawn the con- 
clusion that structural change takes longer than it had earlier envisaged. No less 
significantly, the desire has been expressed within both institutions, at least in 
their governing bodies, for the phase of structural adjustment lending to be con- 
cluded as quickly as possible, so that each can return to its more traditional 
roles, whereas our own treatment has shown adaptation to change as a continu- 
ous necessity, inseparable from development, not at all as a discrete phase. Out 
treatment rejects the view of adjustment as the economics of transition from dis- 
equilibrium to equilibrium. 
In other words, we can think of the structural adjustment programmes of the 
Fund and Bank as an important sub-set of our own understanding of the term: 
more confined in time and coverage, more concerned with adaptation to 
"shocks" than to longer-term trends, but nevertheless addressed to some of the 
most pressing of the problems of economic adaptation. 
Difficulties are, however, created in reconciling these various approaches by 
the differing time spans in which "adjustment" can be set. There is difficulty, 
too, in reconciling policies for the control of aggregate demand with those for 
the restructuring of the productive system. Adequate treatment of these tensions 
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would, however, require a separate paper! 
Implications for Consortium research 
This paper was prepared at the request of the Consortium's Advisory Committee 
in response to a belief that the very large influence of the Bretton Woods institu- 
tions on policy changes in Africa was in danger of biasing policy-related re- 
search away from more fundamental questions of long-term development, and 
that a clearer view was needed of the relationships between adjustment and de- 
velopment. Hopefully it has gone some way in those directions, if only by pro- 
voking other Consortium members to address themselves further to these issues. 
The question remains, however, whether the subject matter covered above de- 
fines an appropriate new area for Consortium-assisted research, particularly 
given its commitment to work that has direct relevance to contemporary policy 
problems. 
I am a little doubtful about this. On the one hand, much of the ground covered 
above is interesting, important and under-researched. And it is surely right that 
we should guard against the distortions in understanding and policy that might 
result from neglect of longer-term issues.46 On the other hand, there would be a 
real danger that the Consortium's work would, as a result, become too diffuse 
and lose some of its immediate policy relevance. While all or most of the spe- 
cific research suggestions made throughout the paper could be defended as rele- 
vant to important questions of policy design, it is nonetheless clear that several 
of them are on topics far from the top of policy makers' agendas. 
These are matters that will be pondered further by the Advisory Committee, 
but it will be valuable to have the views of Consortium members generally on 
this issue, as well as on the substantive content of the paper. 
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Notes 
1. The author is Senior Research Fellow of ODI and Visiting Professor, University 
of Surrey. This paper is based on work currently under way for the Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank, although the author is, of course, 
solely responsible for the views expressed here. He is grateful to Moazzam Malik 
for valuable assistance in the work on which this paper is based. 
2. A commonly held view would classify the more macro aspects of policy into (a) 
stabilization, concerned mainly with the short-run management of aggregate de- 
mand; (b) structural adjustment, dealing more with medium-term measures ad- 
dressed principally to the supply side of the economy; and (c) development, con- 
cerned with change over periods of decades in a wide range of socio-economic 
variables. 
3. Much of what we know about the relationships between economic growth and 
structure is derived from the work of Simon Kuznets (1965, 1966). His work on 
the patterns of "modern economic growth" in the now industrial countries— 
meaning growth from about the middle of the eighteenth century—generated a 
series of historical generalizations about changes that occur during the process of 
modernization that remain generally valid today. Kuznets' historical observations 
are strongly consistent with cross-country observations of the differences between 
countries at various levels of per capita income, with which the name of Hollis 
Chenery (1979, Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin 1986, and 1988) is also particu- 
larly associated. 
4. When measurements are adjusted for economy size, cross-country comparisons 
actually suggest that a country tends to increase its trade relative to GDP as in- 
comes rise. This explains the statistics in line 11 of Table 1 showing larger ex- 
ports relative to GDP at higher per capita income levels. 
5. From World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, Table 12. China and India 
excluded from low-income countries. 
6. See Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986, especially Table 3—7. This shows an 8 
percent increase in the share of non-tradeables in total value added between early 
and late stages of development, with a corresponding reduction in the share of 
tradeables. 
7. From Goldsmith, 1983. 
8. It is with this in mind that economists have referred to the heavy importations of 
capital by the USA in the 1980s as "perverse". 
9. Figures are for 1986. India and China excluded from low-income countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1988, Table 10. 
10. Ram, 1988, provides a brief recent review of the literature on this. 
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11. The notion of consumers' sovereignty is open to the objections that it ignores the 
role of advertising in manipulating demand, and also the influences of technical 
progress and product innovation. 
12. For references on this see Clements, Suhm and Theil, 1979; Finke, Rosalsky and 
Theil, 1983; and Theil and Seale, 1987. 
13. The income elasticity of demand measures the proportionate increase in demand 
for an item resulting from a given proportionate increase in income, holding all 
other variables constant. It is thus a measure of the sensitivity of the demand for 
an item to changes in income. 
14. See UNCTAD, 1988, chapter 11, box 12. 
15. See Bond, 1987, for estimates of income elasticities of demand for primary com- 
modities. 
16. Grilhi and Yang, 1988. For other recent contributions to this debate see Spraos, 
1983, and Sapsford, 1985. 
17. On the biotech revolution and its possible trade implications see two 1988 ODI 
Briefing Papers: "Commodity prices: investing in decline?" and "Agricultural 
biotechnology and the Third World". See also Hobbelink, 1987. 
18. The Hekscher-Ohlin theory has, of course, been subjected to a good deal of criti- 
cism as not explaining well the observed pattern of trade, but a sophisticated re- 
cent study of this concludes that it is possible to explain much trade by reference 
to the relative abundance of productive resources and that the theory "comes out 
looking rather well". See Leamer, 1984. 
19. See Jung, 1986. The references given in his article make up a useful recent bibli- 
ography on the literature on this topic. 
20. That there has been such a spread is widely acknowledged, although it is difficult 
to be precise because most of it has taken the form of a proliferation of "non-tariff 
barriers" (NTBs) which are not readily amenable to quantification. It also seems 
highly likely that these NTBs have been applied in ways that discriminate against 
exports from developing countries. These chiefly affected manufacturers, but the 
high levels of agricultural protection also had an impact on commodity markets. 
According to UNCTAD (1988, annex table 3), in 1987 NTBs affected nearly 25 
percent of all imports by Western industrial countries of goods from developing 
countries, against 21 percent of imports from each other. Both proportions were 
higher than in 1981, although only marginally so in the case of NTBs against im- 
ports from developing countries. 
21. See de Grauwe, 1988, who found that close to 20 percent of the observed slow- 
down in trade among industrial countries since the early 1970s could be attributed 
to increased exchange rate variability. 
22. UN, 1988, Table 4 and passim. In some respects the impact was even more severe 
on the heavily indebted countries—see Selowsky and van der Tak, 1986, who 
emphasize the long-term nature of any possible economic recovery by the heav- 
ily-indebted countries. 
23. World Resources Institute etc., 1986, Table 9.4. The following paragraphs are 
largely based on chapter 8 of this publication and on ODI, 1987. Everest, 1988, 
provides a more up-to-date survey of the state of knowledge on the Greenhouse 
effect and its possible policy implications. 
24. See, for example, Mintzer, 1987. 
25. For fuller discussions of this topic see World Bank World Development Report, 
1988, pp. 7 1—74; Garcia and Llamas, 1988 and Killick, 1984, pp. 260—61. 
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26. On this see Khan and Knight, 1988, who find import compression to have strong 
adverse effects on export performance—a more refined hypothesis that might be 
tested at the country level. See also Mirakhor and Montiel, 1987, on the general 
relationship between import availability and economic performance, and 
Helleiner, 1986. He does not find GDP growth to be significantly related to the 
import/GDP ratio but does find it to be adversely affected by import instability. 
27. See Roemer, 1985, for a valuable discussion of uses and limitations of the main- 
stream literature on Dutch disease in developing-country contexts. 
28. See Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976, chapter 16. 
29. Chenery, 1975, p. 310. See also Chenery, 1988, and Kahler, 1988 for recent sur- 
veys of the structuralist literature. See also Taylor, 1983, for a structuralist theory 
of macroeconomic behaviour and policy. See also his forthcoming report of a 
WIDER study of alternative approaches to adjustment policies. 
30. On the idea of positive adjustment policies see OECD, 1983. 
31. See Killick, 1989, for a survey of contemporary mainstream thinking concerning 
the economic role of the state and its implications for developing countries. 
32. See Elkan, 1988, for a discussion of the supply of entrepreneurship in Africa. He 
argues that governments can best contribute to this by providing a stable macroe- 
conomic environment. 
33. Kaldor, 1972, as discussed in Arndt, 1988 
34. See Sandbrook, 1986, for an exploration along these lines applied to sub-Saharan 
Africa, examining the implications of "patrimonial" government for economic 
management. 
35. Thus, Wheeler's 1984 study of the sources of stagnation in Africa found that the 
most influential policy variable in his tests was an ability to engage in retrench- 
ment in the face of economic deterioration: "Rationing systems which adhere 
tightly to previous levels of importation of capital or consumption goods during 
periods of foreign exchange reduction appear to have done substantially worse, 
ceteris paribus, than those which have retained more flexibility" (p. 18). 
36. For a survey of the relevant literature see Nelson et al., forthcoming, chapter 1. 
See also Sheahan, 1980; Remmer, 1986; and Findlay, 1988. Unfortunately, much 
of this literature is confined to Latin American cases. 
37. It is "rational expectations" theory which is particularly in mind here. Although 
the direct relevance of this theory in all its rigour and on all its necessary assump- 
tions is limited, there is now wide acceptance of the importance of taking public 
reactions into account when devising macroeconomic policies. See Shaw, 1984, 
for a straightforward exposition of rational expectations theory and Corden, 1987, 
for discussion of its relevance to developing countries. 
38. See Lachler, 1988, for an empirical test of the importance of credibility. 
39. "Markets . . . work incrementally. All required changes—in price signals, in 
people's responses to incentives, in shifts in resources—take time. These lags ac- 
count for the fact that elasticities of supply and demand are larger in the long than 
in the short run. Even in Western market economies, it has been recognised that 
very large changes that have had to be accomplished quickly. . . cannot be left to 
market forces. The likelihood of market failure therefore is a function of the de- 
gree of urgency—or impatience—attached to a particular change" (Arndt, 1988, 
p. 227). 
40. Thus the United Nations World Economic Survey, 1985 (p. 15) commented that 
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the larger and more diversified economies with large production capacities were 
better able to adjust to external shocks, taking advantage of under-utilized manu- 
facturing capacity and an ability to switch from home to foreign markets in order 
to expand their exports. 
41. Kubo et a!., 1986, p. 224, note this and that, in consequence, trade led to more 
rapid structural transformation than otherwise would have occurred in the coun- 
tries they studied. 
42. ". . an export-promotion strategy appears to place certain kinds of 
upon economic policy and its implementation; those constraints, in turn, limit the 
magnitude and duration of policy mistakes and also tend to force policies to work 
through pricing, rather than quantitative, interventions . . . a growth strategy ori- 
ented towards exports entails the development of policies that make markets and 
incentives function better.. ." (Krueger, 1978, P. 284). 
43. The forthcoming Nelson et al, study (see bibliography) provides an example of 
this type of study upon which future researchers could fruitfully build. 
44. For an account of the early history of SALs and an espousal of this type of lend- 
ing by the Bank, see Please, 1984, chapters 3 and 4. 
45. See de Vries, 1987, for the Fund's official account of the EFF and SAF; and 
Killick, 1984, pp. 247—50, for an evaluation of the EFF. 
46. Significantly, the next in the World Bank's series of reports on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, initiated by the Berg Report, is intended to deal with some of the more 
fundamental problems facing African countries. 
The principal objective of the African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC), established in August 1988, is to strengthen local capacity for 
conducting independent, rigourous inquiry into problems pertinent to the 
management of economies in Sub-Saharan African. 
In response to special needs of the region, AERC has adopted a flexible 
approach to improve the technical skills of local researchers, allow for 
regional determination of research priorities, strengthen national institu- 
tions concerned with economic policy research, and facilitate closer ties 
between researchers and policymakers. 
Since its establishment, AERC has been supported by private founda- 
tions, bilateral aid agencies and international organizations, 
Special Papers contain the findings of commissioned studies in further- 
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ing. 
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research financed by the AERC. 
It is AERC's policy that authors of Special and Research papers are free 
to use material contained therein in other publications. Views expressed 
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